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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : Case No. 20010175-CA 
AARON TOMAS HERRERA, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for one count each of 
robbery and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted 
person, both second degree felonies. This Court has appellate 
jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) 
(1996) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion by imposing 
consecutive sentences, where the record reflects that the court 
had read the presentence investigation report documenting 
defendant's history, character, and rehabilitative needs as well 
as the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and, further, 
had made a personal assessment of defendant's credibility at the 
sentencing hearing? 
A sentence will not be overturned on appeal unless the trial 
1 
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court has abused its discretion, failed to consider all legally 
relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that exceeds legally 
prescribed limits. State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 
1989)(citations omitted). The Utah Supreme Court has noted that 
"the exercise of discretion in sentencing necessarily reflects 
the personal judgment of the court and the appellate court can 
properly find abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable 
[person] would take the view adopted by the trial court." State 
v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401, governing concurrent and 
consecutive sentences, provides: 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant 
has been adjudged guilty of more than one 
felony offense, whether to impose concurrent 
or consecutive sentences for the offenses.... 
(4) A court shall consider the gravity and 
circumstances of the offenses and the 
history, character, and rehabilitative needs 
of the defendant in determining whether to 
impose consecutive sentences. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401(1), -401 (4) (1999) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
After a carjacking followed by a high speed chase, defendant 
was charged with aggravated robbery and aggravating kidnaping, 
both first degree felonies, as well as failure to respond to an 
officer's signal to stop and possession of a dangerous weapon by 
2 
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a restricted person, both third degree felonies (R. 3-5). He 
eventually entered a guilty plea to robbery, subject to 
enhancements for using a dangerous weapon in the commission of 
the offense and acting in concert with two or more other persons, 
and to possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, 
both second degree felonies (R. 43-45, 50-57). After reviewing a 
presentence investigation report, the trial court sentenced 
defendant to the Utah State Prison on both charges and ordered 
that the sentences run consecutively (R. 59-61). l This timely 
appeal followed (R. 63). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Around 2 a.m. on a November morning, Keith Garcia was 
driving home from his job in his new Honda Civic, which he had 
had for less than a week (R. 79: 6, 11, 14). "[T]wo turns away" 
from his house, three males who had been walking down the road 
"waved [him] down." (Id. at 7, 16). Unconcerned, Keith stopped 
the car (Id. at 17). Defendant approached the driver's window; 
the other two individuals, who were juveniles, circled around to 
the passenger side of the vehicle (Id. at 7, 17) . 
1
 The court ordered defendant to serve an enhanced sentence 
of 6-15 years on the "robbery with the gun enhancement" (R. 61). 
On the charge of possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted 
person, the court applied the group enhancement and ordered "1-15 
years and 1-5 years" (R. 61). This is clearly incorrect. 
Pursuant to an amended information, defendant entered pleas to 
robbery with enhancements for use of a gun and acting in concert, 
and to possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person 
(R. 43-45, 50-57) . 
3 
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Defendant spoke first, demanding that Keith open the door 
(Id. at 21). When Keith just sat there, looking at him, 
defendant pulled out a gun and commanded him to "open [your] 
fucking door" (Id. at 8, 20-22) . Keith complied (Id. at 8, 22) . 
Defendant immediately put the gun to Keith's head, while one of 
the other individuals moved around and put a knife to his side 
(Id. at 9, 23). 
Defendant ordered Keith out of his car (Id. at 23). As soon 
as he tried to get out, however, defendant said, "never mind," 
and pushed him back in (Id. at 9, 24-25) . All three perpetrators 
then got into the vehicle, with defendant sitting directly behind 
the driver's seat (Id. at 9-10). They told Keith they were going 
"jacking" (Id. at 10, 24). Keith said he'd drive them wherever 
they wanted to go (Id. at 24). 
Keith drove the few blocks to his own home. He testified 
about his action at this juncture: 
I said I was going to stop the car and I was 
going to let them take it. And I took my 
hand off the steering wheel and I just 
stopped. I was just like this [witness lifts 
both hands about shoulder high], and I said 
you guys take my car. Do what you want, you 
know. And then that's when I got out of the 
car. 
(Id. at 32; accord id. at 10-11). Defendant responded that it 
was fine, that they were just borrowing the car, and that he 
would bring it back (Id. at 12). As Keith got out of the car, 
defendant hopped into the driver's seat and "peeled out" with 
4 
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Keith's brand new car (Id. at 12, 28). Keith ran home and called 
the police (Id. at 12). 
A patrol sergeant located the vehicle in the neighborhood 
where the carjacking had occurred (Id. at 35). A high speed 
chase ensued, with defendant and the pursuing police vehicle 
reaching speeds of up to 90 miles per hour through both 
commercial and residential areas (Id. at 35-38) . Finally, when 
the chase failed to end after defendant drove through a full 
chain link fence, the officer executed a "pursuit intervention 
technique" (Id. at 38-3 9). The technique was intended to cause 
the car driven by defendant to spin out, but instead the vehicle 
slammed into a curb, the tires "popped", and the car rolled, 
finally coming to rest on the front lawn of a residence, with the 
driver's side against the ground (Id. at 40-41, 47-48). 
The officer described what happened next: 
[W]e had a lot of officers . . . coming into 
the area, and we had two dogs out on the 
leash and lots of deputies' firearms pointed 
at the suspects and [defendant] was trying to 
kick his way out, punching, kicking, rocking 
back and forth with the car. So we just held 
on him to see what he was going to try to do 
. . . . [H]e realized he was surrounded by 
police officers, kind of gave us a look like, 
all right, caught, and he put his hands in 
the air. 
(R. 41). The police then executed a felony stop (Id. at 42). 
The same officer later interviewed defendant. He testified: 
"[Defendant] was pretty nonchalant about the whole thing, telling 
5 
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me jokes and stuff on the way to the substation. . . . Once we 
got him [sic] I could tell - he was what [w]e call tweaking" (Id. 
at 55). The officer described "tweaking" as observable behaviors 
associated with coming off a methamphetamine high, such as 
twitching and rapid eye movement (Id. at 55-56). Describing the 
subsequent interview, the officer testified: "[Defendant] would 
say, initially, I don't remember a thing, and then he would for 
sure tell me that he didn't have a gun. So it was back and 
forth. He could remember stuff and then he couldn't (Id. at 56). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion 
by imposing consecutive sentences without entering findings of 
fact that demonstrated its consideration of all the statutory 
sentencing factors. He raises this argument either as plain 
error or pursuant to Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e). Any 
error the court might conceivably have committed, however, could 
not be "plain" because there is no settled appellate law to guide 
the sentencing court to the result defendant seeks. And because 
the court did not impose the sentence illegally, rule 22(e) 
provides no ground for review of defendant's unpreserved claim. 
Should the Court nonetheless choose to reach the merits, 
defendant's claim fails because there is no legal requirement 
that the court make findings of fact before imposing consecutive 
sentences and, further, because he has not shown that the trial 
6 
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court did not consider all of the statutory factors. Indeed, 
defendant gives short shrift to the presentence investigation 
report, which explored all of the statutory factors, and wholly 
ignores the court's interchange with defendant at the sentencing 
hearing. Ultimately, the trial court simply interpreted and 
weighed the data before it differently than did defendant. 
In this case, it cannot be said that "no reasonable [person] 
would take the view adopted by the trial court." State v. 
Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978). Consequently, the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion by ordering consecutive 
sentences. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
DEFENDANT'S UNPRESERVED CLAIM 
CANNOT CONSTITUTE PLAIN ERROR, NOR 
SHOULD THIS COURT CONSIDER IT 
PURSUANT TO UTAH RULE OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 22(e) 
a. Lack of factual findings does not constitute plain error 
because the law does not mandate that a court enter factual 
findings before imposing consecutive sentences. 
While defendant argues that findings of fact should be 
required before a court imposes consecutive sentences, he failed 
to raise the issue or challenge the lack of record findings in 
the trial court. For this reason, he raises his claim as plain 
error, arguing that "the trial court committed plain error when 
it ordered [defendant] to serve consecutive prison terms without 
7 
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making findings on the record in light of relevant statutory 
factors." Br. of App. at 7. 
The law is well-settled that to prevail in a plain error 
analysis, defendant must demonstrate that the trial court erred, 
that the error should have been obvious, and that, absent the 
error, he had a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). Even 
assuming arguendo that the trial court did err in not entering 
findings of fact, defendant would still have to prove that the 
error was obvious or "plain." "To show obviousness of the error, 
[defendant] must show that the law was clear at the time of 
trial." State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App. 19 f 6, 18 P.3d 1123; 
accord State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah App. 1997)("Utah 
courts have repeatedly held that a trial court's error is not 
plain where there is no settled appellate law to guide the trial 
court"). 
Defendant concedes that the sentencing statute, section 76-
3-401(4), does not require explicit findings on the record. See 
Br. of App. at 8. Nonetheless, he argues that "Utah case law 
supports such a determination." Id. For this contention, he 
cites two cases, State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236 (Utah 1995) and 
State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1993). Both Smith and 
Strunk, however, are minimum mandatory sentencing cases, governed 
by a specific statute that mandated findings of fact on the 
8 
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record whenever a trial court departed from the middle level of 
severity. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(5) (a), (d) (1995) . In 
contrast, as defendant concedes, the statute at issue here makes 
no mention of findings of fact. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 
(1999). For this reason, defendant's reliance on Smith and 
Strunk is misplaced. 
No settled Utah law, either statutory or judicially 
fashioned, requires findings of fact before a trial court can 
impose consecutive sentences. Consequently, any error in failing 
to enter findings cannot constitute plain error. Defendant's 
argument, therefore, necessarily fails under a plain error 
analysis.2 
b. Appellate review is not justified pursuant to rule 22(e) 
because defendant has failed to demonstrate that the court 
imposed sentence in an illegal manner. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e) provides that "[t]he 
court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in 
an illegal manner, at any time." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). 
Defendant contends that the trial court here "imposed consecutive 
sentences in an illegal manner." Br. of App. at 7-8. 
Specifically, defendant seems to be arguing that the trial 
court's lack of record findings evidences its failure to consider 
all statutory sentencing factors, necessarily resulting in an 
2
 In essence, defendant is asking this court to fashion a 
new rule of law. Such a request, however, cannot come before the 
court in the procedural posture of plain error. 
9 
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illegally imposed sentence. 
Defendant's reliance on rule 22(e) as a basis for appellate 
review is misplaced because he has failed to demonstrate that the 
sentence was imposed illegally. As has been discussed, no 
appellate or statutory law mandates that a trial court enter 
findings of fact prior to entering consecutive sentences. 
Furthermore, where the record shows, as it does here, that the 
trial court had before it information regarding all statutory 
factors, a reviewing court assumes that the trial court 
considered them. See State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 651-52 
(Utah App. 1997)(sentencing court properly considered statutory 
factors where relevant evidence was presented through record 
evidence, including presentence investigation report). 
Consequently, rule 22(e) does not provide a ground for appellate 
review. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN IMPOSING CONSECUTIVE 
SENTENCES WHERE THE RECORD REFLECTS 
THAT THE COURT CONSIDERED 
DEFENDANT'S HISTORY, CHARACTER, AND 
REHABILITATIVE NEEDS AS WELL AS THE 
GRAVITY AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE 
CHARGED OFFENSES 
Because the law does not require findings of fact, 
defendant's argument is reduced to a contention that the trial 
court abused its discretion by ordering consecutive sentences 
without first considering all of the statutory sentencing 
10 
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factors. He assumes that because the trial court did not 
articulate factual findings, it did not consider all of the 
factors.3 See Br. of App. at 15-20. Defendant's assumption, 
however, is unsupported by the law. 
Section 76-3-401 of the Utah Code governs the trial court's 
authority to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences. This 
statute directs the court to "consider the gravity and 
circumstances of the offenses and the history, character, and 
rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
401(4). A trial court may thus abuse its discretion if it 
imposes a sentence without considering all of the factors that 
are legally relevant to the sentencing determination. See, e.g., 
State v. McCovev, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990); State v. 
Montova, 929 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah App. 1996). 
The court's discretion in weighing the statutory factors 
3
 Based on this argument, defendant asks this Court to 
"vacate the consecutive sentences and remand the case to the 
trial court for proper consideration of the facts in light of the 
statutory factors." See Br. of App. at 14. In essence, then, 
defendant seeks a resentencing. Id. at 22. Such a remedy, 
however, is off the mark. Adult Probation and Parole had 
completed a comprehensive evaluation of defendant. Defendant had 
read the presentence report and offered corrections to it. The 
court, therefore, had before it all data relevant to the 
sentencing determination and ample evidence to support the 
consecutive sentences it imposed. See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 
774, 787 n.6 (Utah 1991)(reviewing court upholds trial court in 
absence of findings when it would be reasonable to assume court 
actually made such findings). Under the circumstances, even if 
defendant prevailed in his argument, the appropriate remedy would 
be a remand for entry of findings based on the undisputed record 
evidence, not a resentencing. 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
reflects the general principle that courts are accorded broad 
discretion in sentencing matters. Plainly, the trial court is in 
the most advantaged position to make the highly individualistic 
assessments required in sentencing decisions. See State v. 
Woodland, 945 P.2d 665, 671 (Utah 1997) (sentencing "necessarily 
reflects the personal judgment of the court"). In deciding the 
appropriateness of a particular sentence, a trial court must 
consider many intangibles, like the defendant's "character, 
personality, and attitude, of which the cold record gives little 
inkling." State v. Sibert, 310 P.2d 388, 393 (Utah 1957); see 
also State v. McClendon, 611 P,2d 728, 729 (Utah 1980). 
Moreover, a sentencing court's assessment of defendant's 
character and feelings of remorse may be based, at least in part, 
on the court's personal observation of defendant's body language, 
demeanor, and tone of voice, none of which are reflected in the 
record on appeal. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 
1994). On review, then, the appellate court regularly defers to 
the trial court's decision unless it is clear that "no reasonable 
[person] would take the view adopted by the trial court." 
Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887. 
The sentencing statute, while directing consideration of all 
factors, does not require the court to accord each of the factors 
equal weight. See, e.g., State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 117-19 
(Utah 1985) (recognizing that sentencing judges generally give 
12 
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considerable weight to circumstances of crime); State v. Carson, 
597 P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1979)(judge has discretion in determining 
weight given to sentencing recommendations contained in 
evaluation reports). Nor does the statute preclude a court, 
having considered all of the circumstances, from determining that 
punishment should take precedence over rehabilitation. See State 
v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 458 (Utah App. 1993) ("trial court did 
not abuse its discretion by placing more emphasis on punishing 
defendant rather than rehabilitating him"). 
Defendant's argument fails because he has not demonstrated 
that the trial court did not consider all the statutory factors. 
Rather, he seems to be arguing only that the court weighed the 
factors improperly, failing to give due weight to the 
interpretation of the facts he would like to be dispositive. 
The preliminary hearing testimony and the presentence 
investigation report in this case contained information 
addressing all statutory factors. As to the gravity and 
circumstances of the offense, defendant's actions in kidnaping 
Keith Garcia at gunpoint, taking his car, and engaging in a high-
speed chase with the police through neighborhoods and commercial 
areas, both on and off the streets, not only put the victim at 
risk, but also endangered members of the public. 
Defendant's ten-year criminal history involved multiple 
felony convictions, prison time served in Colorado, and a variety 
13 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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of other Colorado criminal charges whose disposition was unknown 
(PSR at 7-8) .4 His family history was marked by poverty, 
alcoholism, and drug abuse (Id. at 11). He began consuming 
alcohol at age 12 and abusing it by age 15. And while defendant 
expressed a willingness to attend alcohol abuse counseling, the 
presentence investigator reported that defendant believed he was 
"not in need of such therapeutic treatment" (Id.). 
Perhaps most significantly, defendant began smoking 
marijuana at age 8, using it daily for the next 10 years. By age 
14, he was using cocaine and methamphetamines as well, and for 
the two years prior to the current crime, he used 
methamphetamines daily (Id.). Defendant stated that "drugs are 
'all [he's] ever known'" and that they were "'pushed onto him' by 
his family" (Id. at 12). He had not worked at all for two years 
because of his drug abuse (Id.). 
As to defendant's character, the officer who testified at 
the preliminary hearing reported to the presentence investigator 
that defendant was "not cooperative" and that he "never owned up 
to the truth" (Id. at 7). The investigator observed, 
"[Defendant] is minimizing his participation in this offense, 
reporting [that] he let the victim know the gun was broken and 
4
 Defendant self-reported that he had charges as far back 
as 1983, when he was a juvenile, although the presentence 
investigator was unable to locate records to substantiate this 
information (PSR: 7) . 
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did not have any bullets" (Id. at 15). The court further 
explored defendant's attitude towards his criminal conduct at the 
sentencing hearing. Responding to the court's query about a 
Colorado felony conviction for ''menacing," defendant explained 
that the term meant "brandishing a weapon" and that he pled 
guilty only to get out of jail (R. 80: 3) . The following 
exchange then ensued: 
The Court 
Defendant: 
The Court: 
Defendant: 
The Court: 
Defendant: 
The Court: 
Defendant: 
The Court 
I've got to tell you that when 
somebody denies having 
committed a crime that they've 
pled guilty to, I don't give 
it any credence. 
I was drunk in a Circle K and 
I was eating some Hogi 
sandwiches - . . . 
I'm a little concerned that 
you're not accepting 
responsibility for your past. 
I accept the responsibility. 
How are you accepting 
responsibility? 
I did my time for it. I 
accepted it. I pled guilty to 
it. . . . 
But you're saying you didn't 
do it. 
I pulled a knob out of my 
pocket while the lady was 
calling officers because I was 
eating sandwiches -
Why did you pull the knob out 
of your pocket? 
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Defendant: I was drunk. I don't even 
remember. 
The Court: You're in major denial. 
R. 80: 4. Finally, as to defendant's rehabilitative needs, they 
were obviously quite substantial.5 Nonetheless, the court 
sentenced defendant to the maximum term on each felony and 
ordered that the sentences run consecutively. In doing so, the 
court stated: 
I've given you as much as I can give you. . . 
and it wasn't a tough choice. Your choices 
have left me with no choice and when I look 
at Mr. [Keith] Garcia and I look at you, and 
I listen to what you have to say about your 
past actions, your present actions, I see no 
trace of remorse. I see no acknowledgment of 
responsibility and in the letter there are 
pat phrases about I'm so sorry, I hope this 
is something you can get over. I have no 
sense that you have any responsibility in 
your own mind for this and I think you are a 
very dangerous individual.... 
[M]any things go into a [j]udge's 
consideration, many considerations are part 
of sentencing. One is protection of the 
community. That is the principle reason for 
the sentence. The other is to deter, or one 
of the others, is to deter further conduct of 
this type[,] and then there's simply 
punishment. 
[T]he bottom line is you have had a hard 
5 There is no record evidence, however, to support a 
positive prognosis for treatment. Indeed, the clear implication 
from defendant's lengthy history of alcohol and drug abuse and 
his continuing denial was that his rehabilitative prognosis was 
poor. 
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life. There's no doubt about it[,] but a lot 
of people who have a hard life, even those 
who turn to crime, stand before me and say 
I've done everything they've said I've done. 
You didn't say that. You have an excuse for 
everything you've ever done in your life and 
this is inexcusable. . . . [T]hese crimes are 
so abhorrent that you leave me with no choice 
on the sentence and it's forthwith. 
Id. at 23-24. The sentencing court's rationale for its sentence 
is unambiguous.6 The court determined that the violent nature of 
defendant's conduct, combined with his life-long dysfunctional 
history and consistent pattern of denial, mandated that 
protection of the public, deterrence, and punishment should take 
precedence over rehabilitation and leniency in sentencing. Such 
a weighing of the statutory factors is precisely what a 
sentencing court is bound to do and is plainly within its broad 
discretion. See Nuttall, 861 P.2d at 458 (no abuse of discretion 
where court emphasized punishment over rehabilitation); State v. 
Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 268 (Utah 1986) (no abuse of discretion 
where court emphasized retribution over rehabilitation). 
Under the undisputed factual circumstances of this case, it 
6
 Defendant asserts that "the facts bearing on the court's 
consecutive sentencing order were ambiguous." Br. of App. at 12. 
As the court's ruling and the supporting record evidence 
indicate, however, the facts were clear and undisputed. 
Defendant's assertion of ambiguity more accurately focuses on the 
weighing of the factors, a matter plainly within the province of 
the sentencing court. See, e.g., Carson, 597 P.2d at 864 
(discussing court's discretion in weighing sentencing 
recommendations); State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188, 192 (Utah 
1990)(discussing court's discretion in weighing aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances in sentencing). 
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cannot be said that "no reasonable [person] would take the view 
adopted by the trial court." Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887. The 
court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in imposing 
consecutive prison terms. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
consecutive sentences for robbery and possession of a dangerous 
weapon by a restricted person. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this lb day of August, 2001. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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